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COMMENT
A PROPOSED REGIME AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
ON THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
OUTER SPACE
Andrew H. Pontionst
I.

INTRODUCTION

Outer Space law is a new and expanding branch of international law. The advent of the technological capabilities necessary to
reach outer space has produced a need for new forms of law to regulate states', individuals' and corporate rights in its resources. Thus
far, treaties, customary international law political policy decisions
have played roles in forming the general principles of law as they
exist today. However, state' opinions differ concerning these general principles. Thus, more specific regulations governing outer
space activities are needed concerning states' participatory2 rights
to claim, explore, exploit, use or research outer space and its nonrenewable resources. International agreements such as the United
Nations Charter,3 the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space IncludCopyright © Andrew H. Pontious 1991. All Rights Reserved.
t Candidate for J.D., 1991, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S. in Astronautical and Aeronautical Engineering, Purdue University, 1986.
1. "States" in the context of this comment utilizes the international legal definition of
a "state" which is any territory satisfying the following criteria: 1) a defined territory and a
permanent population, 2) under control of its own government, and 3) engaging in or has the

capacity to engage in formal relations with other such entities. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].

2. "Participatory" in the context of this paper stands for those rights and benefits
acruing to each nation as a result of outer space commercialization and exploitation. Art. II
of Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signatureJan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force with respect to
the United States, Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] provides that celestial
bodies are not subject to national appropriation. Consequently, the international debate regarding the regulation of outer space involves the rights and benefits each nation can expect
as a result of outer space exploration, commercialization and exploitation.

3. U.N.

CHARTER.

COMPUTER &HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,4 the 1979 Agreement

Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial

Bodies,5 the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty (LOS Treaty)6 and the
1959 Antarctic Treaty7 provide the basic foundation in the field of

property rights to lands outside national jurisdictions. However,
conflicts in interpretation, compliance and the role of custom concerning the aforementioned treaties exist.
The conflicts have consistently included the majority of the developing countries' claim of property or participatory rights in the

benefits of outer space through the theory of the "common heritage
of mankind" (CHM).8 Through this concept, the states without
outer space capabilities attempt to reserve for themselves rights to
the future benefits in technology, knowledge and profits resulting

from exploitation of celestial resources and other commercial activities in outer space claiming that all belongs to mankind. On the
other hand, developed nations disagree. They find this principle re-

strictive, and private industries fear any regulations curtailing their
potential for economic benefits.
The following will analyze past terrestrial and extraterrestrial
precedents which are potential models for the governing regime of

outer space. Each model is based on differing historical, environmental and legal principles making the application to outer space a

complex interaction of legal, political, environmental and financial
factors. After analyzing the various precedents and their respective
effects on the commercialization 9 of outer space, this comment goes
on to summarize the United States' stance, as a major space power,
4. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2.
5. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979) (adopted by General Assembly Resolution
34/68 of Dec. 5, 1979. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 (A/34/46) p.77) [hereinafter
Moon Treaty]. However, the United States has refused to ratify the Moon Treaty due to its
incorporation of the common heritage of mankind concept. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS
Treaty].
7. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
8. Article 11, para. 1 of the Moon Treaty, supra note 5 states, "[t]he moon and its
natural resources are the common heritage of mankind" and article 136 of the LOS Treaty,
supra note 6 states, "[t]he Area and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind."
9. "Commercialization" is used loosely to denote the activites in exploiting non-renewable celestial resources for experimentation, research and eventual commercial enterprise.
Before any actual commercialization of celestial resources can occur, preliminary research
into the availability of resources, the cost effectiveness of harvest, and future uses must be
examined. Consequently, for the purposes of this comment, "commercialization" will denote
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on the commercialization of outer space. Finally, a new regime is
offered as a solution to the current conflicts in the regulation of
outer space.
II.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE

A.

OuterSpace Treaty

The basis for outer space law and extraterrestrial participatory
rights emerged with the signature of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.10
As of January 1, 1990, just under one hundred states were parties to
this treaty. 1 The treaty codifies the general international principles
the entire sphere of activities necessary to begin actual commercial enterprise in gathering
celestial resources.
10.

3, 96TH

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, PART
CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE AcrnvmEs OF

STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 309 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter COMM. PRINT PART 3 1980].
11. TREATIES IN FORCE 379 (1990). The countries are:

Afghanistan
Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas, The
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Benin
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Union of Myanmar (Burma)
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Rep.
Canada
Chile
Cuba

Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Fiji
Finland
France
German Dem. Rep.
Germany, Fed. Rep.

Lebanon
Libya
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Mexico

Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
Norway
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Poland
Romania
St. Kitts & Nevis

St. Lucia
San Marino
Saudi Arabia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Is.
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland

160
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between states relating to outer space between states and provides
the legal framework upon which subsequent outer space agreements
will be based. 2 Additionally, with no evidence of any consistently
dissenting states and by the majority of the world's ratification of it,
the treaty has been transformed into international law binding those
non-party states to its terms, thus becoming part of customary international law.' 3 Silence is consent.
However, due to the treaty's general nature, 1 4 the specific outer
space legal structure is primarily controlled by the general principles of customary international law' 5 and not by specific international legislation.' s Article I of the Outer Space Treaty states,
"[o]uter space.., shall be free for exploration and use by all States
. . .on a basis of equality and in accordance with international
law."" 7 As is evident in the world today, "international law" is
more of an after-the-fact justification for action rather than having
any actual regulatory effect. Consequently, more specific regulation
Greece
Syrian Arab Rep.
Grenada
Thailand
Guinea-Bissau
Togo
Hungary
Tonga
Iceland
Tunisia
India
Turkey
Iraq
Uganda
Ireland
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rep.
Israel
Union of Soviet Socialist Reps.
Italy
United Kingdom
Jamaica
United States
Japan
Uruguay
Kenya
Venezuela
Korea
Vietnam, Socialist Rep.
Kuwait
Yemen (Aden)
Laos
Zambia
12. 0. OGuNBANwo, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE AcrvmEs xvi
(1975). "Some multilateral agreements may come to be law for non-parties that do not actively dissent. That may be the effect where a multilateral agreement is designed for adherence by states generally, is widely accepted, and not rejected by a significant number of
important states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102(i) ("important" in the con-

text of outer space legislation are those states with the ability to reach outer space). See also
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(i), supra note 1 and accompanying text; see
supra note 12.
14. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
15. See infra page 185-86.
16. Agreement Governingthe Activities ofStateson the Moon and OtherCelestialBodies'
Hearingson S.115 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980) (statement of Robert B. Owen, Legal Advisor, Department of State)
[hereinafter S 115 Hearings].
17. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, para. 2. See Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1(b).
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is needed in outer space to specify, in advance of action, exactly
what rights exist, what activities are lawful and what states' rights
are to future benefits.
1. Underlying Principles of the Outer Space Treaty
International cooperation in achieving the free use of outer
space for all states forms the underlying philosophy of the Outer
Space Treaty. 8 The United States' policy, as a space power, has
been to promote this international cooperative policy as declared in
the NASA Act of 1958.19 In fact, President Nixon enunciated the
United States' stance on the world participation in the exploration
of outer space in 1969 during his address to the United Nations
General Assembly stating that the journey into space is "an adventure that belongs not to one nation but to all mankind, and one that
should be marked not by rivalry but by the same spirit of fraternal
cooperation that has so long been the hallmark of the international
community of science." 20 With the United States and the USSR as
the only states with the technological ability to explore outer space
at that time, this statement emphasizes the underlying philosophy
of international cooperation present in the Outer Space Treaty.
2.

Reasons for the Outer Space Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty actually grew out of an anticipatory
need for space regulation because technology had not yet advanced
to the level of celestial exploitation and exploration. Consequently,
only a very general legal framework was laid down. Former United
States' Ambassador Goldberg, in an address to the United Nations
in 1966, stated that the Outer Space Treaty was not to provide "for
every contingency that might arise in the exploration and use of
space, many of which are unforeseeable, but rather to establish a set
21
of basic rules."
The 1969 lunar landing by the United States created new possibilities in the technological and legal realms of outer space.2 2
18. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2.
19. Hearings on HR. 85 Before the Subcomn. on Space and Applications of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (statement of Carl Q. Christol, Professor of International Law and Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Southern California) [hereinafter HR. 85 Hearings]. See National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1982).
20. SUBCOMM. ON SPACE, SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS OF THE HousE COMM. ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WORLD-WIDE SPACE AcmVrnEs, H.R_ Doc. No. 352, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1977).
21. HR. 85 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1.
22. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON SCIENCE, COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION, PART
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With men on the moon, the reality of celestial commercialization
and resource exploitation advanced faster than the existing legal
regulations. Thereafter, the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)2 3 began to
study how to govern man's activities on the moon.2 4 Specifically,
COPUOS focused on the question of legal rights to the natural nonrenewable resources of the celestial bodies.25 Today, the increase in
technological capabilities brings the possibility of celestial exploitation into the near future. Consequently, the Outer Space Treaty
needs supplementation to address future rights in outer space and
the benefits accruing from outer space exploitation and
commercialization.
3.

Outer Space Treaty Statutory Rights

Specifically, the Outer Space Treaty declares that exploration
of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is to
be carried out for "the benefit and in the interests of all countries,"2 6 that such bodies are "the province of all mankind,"2 7 and
shall only be used for peaceful purposes.2 " Although appropriation
of celestial bodies is forbidden,2 9 "[oluter space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, shall be free for the exploration and use
by all States... ."30 The question of what "use" means arises in the
contexts of Articles I, II, III, IV, IX, X, XI, and XIII as well as the
meaning of "activities" in Articles VI, IX, and XIII of the Outer
Space Treaty.31 The United States holds the position that exploitation of celestial resources and its associated activities are included in
the definitions of these terms.32 However, at the time of the treaty,
4, 96 CONG., 2D SESs., AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE AcTIvITIEs OF STATES ON THE
MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 390 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter COMM. PRINT
PART 4 1980].
23. The Legal Subcommittee on the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, hereinafter COPUOS, is a General Assembly organization created in 1959 to study the
legal issues in outer space. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 389.
24. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 389.
25. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 390.
26. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I. para. 1.
27. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, para. I.
28. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 2.
29. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. II.
30. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, para. 2.
31. H.R. 85 Hearings, supra note 19, at 3. The word "exploitation" never actually appears in the Outer Space Treaty causing controversy as to the interpretation of the uses and
activities phrases in the Outer Space Treaty.
32. See DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 674 (1980) (quoting Robert B. Owen, Legal Advisor,
Department of State) [hereinafter DIGEST].
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technology had not yet advanced to the point of actually carrying
out such endeavors. Consequently, discussions on interpretation
was held to a minimum leaving open the exact definitions in issue.
Other than the few basic guidelines set down, customary international law was to be the governing body."
III.

LEGAL ISSUES

The legal dilemma of states' rights to exploit and commercialize celestial bodies remains an open question for which no universally accepted solution exists. Various legal precedents are available
which could be utilized in the creation of regulations to govern future activities in space and to fill gaps in the Outer Space Treaty.
However, due to the unique problems and disagreements created
between nations by the proposed application of these precedents,
none have yet been applied conclusively to outer space.
Unfortunately, utilization of the precedents to the outer space
realm may have ramifications on the United States' commercialization; specifically, non-renewable natural resource exploitation. On
one hand, the United States pushes for the adoption of precedents
and treaty interpretations protecting states' rights, and consequently, the private sector's rights, to exploit the celestial resources
in outer space. On the other hand, the third world countries push
for the application of precedents and treaty interpretations declaring that the celestial bodies and their resources are the common
heritage of mankind and belong to no one individually but to all the
world as a whole. Thus, all benefits and profits resulting from the
exploitation of outer space would also belong to all and would be
distributed "equitably"' among all states. Needless to say, the private sector's future investment in outer space seems to depend on
the outcome of this conceptual legal battle and the eventual structuring of outer space regulation.

33. S 115 Hearings, supra note 16, at 21.
34. "Equitably" is often used when speaking of the Moon Treaty and LOS Treaty in
conjunction with the CHM concept to define how benefits of future technological advancements are to be distributed to the world. However, nowhere in either treaty is "equitably"
specifically defined which raises the issue of how to implement a distribution policy.
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IV.

TERRESTRIAL AND EXTRATERRESTRIAL LEGAL
PRECEDENTS

A.

Antarctica Treaty
1. Application of Antarctica Principles to Outer Space

The Antarctica Treaty is a substantive legal system which is a
potential model for a legal structure regulating outer space. The
main issues involved with such application are two fold. One is
whether Antarctica and outer space present similar legal and physical environments conducive to applying the Antarctic precedents to
that of outer space. The second issue is whether the United States
would approve such an application of principles in view of the possible ramifications on the technological advancement of United
States' commercial space industries, especially that of celestial
exploitation.
In the following discussion, the physical and legal environments of Antarctica and outer space are examined which favor the
application of the Antarctica Treaty principles to outer space. Additionally, the United States would favor this application even if the
third world states, non-space powers, would not.35
2.

History and Background

The Antarctica Treaty of 1959 resulted from four causes: 1)
various states' overlapping territorial claims in Antarctica, 2) the
conflicts resulting from the United States and the USSR refusing to
recognize any of the said claims, 3) fear of military conflict due to
the cold war between the United States and the USSR, and 4) the
need for cooperative scientific research. 36 To accomodate these
fears, conflicts and desires, the Antarctica Treaty was entered into
by the United States, the USSR, Japan, Belgium, South Africa, the
United Kingdom, France, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, Chile
and Argentina 7 for "two primary goals: 1) to preserve Antarctica
as an area for peaceful uses only; and 2) to promote freedom of
'38
scientific investigation throughout the continent."
The governing structure formed by the treaty consists of two
tiers, the consultative parties and the non-consultative parties.39
35. See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
36. Barcelo, The InternationalLegal Regime for Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J.

157 (1986).
37. Id at 156.
38. Id at 157.
39. See generally Antarctic Treaty, supranote 7 and accompanying text. The consulta-
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The consultative parties are those nations which have demonstrated
an "interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station
or the dispatch of a scientific expedition."' Due to their substantial
interest and knowledge of Antarctica, these nations make all decisions affecting Antarctica. The non-consultative parties are those
states which have acceded to the treaty but have not yet complied
with the "demonstrated interest" test.4 1 These states may observe
the decision making meetings but technically have no vote. Any
state belonging to the United Nations may become a non-consultative party.4 2 This two tiered system keeps control of Antarctica and
its future in the hands of those states most knowledgeable, experienced and involved with Antarctica.4 3
However, with the increasing worldwide interest in the conservation of common resources,' third world countries have realized
the potential of the Antarctic region in both future resources and
also as a strategic military stronghold.4 5 Hence, third world states
have begun to demand universal participatory rights in the governing of Antarctica." These third world countries, through the
United Nations, are demanding revision of the Antarctica Treaty
subjecting it to the governance of the United Nations and consequently, themselves.
Regardless of the exclusive nature of government in Antarctica, the management by the consultative parties has resulted in
nearly twenty-five years of successful international management
of Antarctica, the continuing observance of the freezing of territorial claims, and the remarkable level of cooperation achieved
by a nonhomogeneous group of participants, [which] is evidence
of the sense of responsibility that the Parties to the Antarctic
Treaty maintain toward the international community as a
whole.4 7
tive parties are the original parties to the Treaty plus Poland, West Germany, Brazil, India,
the People's Republic of China and Uruguay. Barcelo, supra note 36, at 159.
40. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX, para. 2.
41. Barcelo, supra note 36, at 159. The non-consultative parties are Bulgaria, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, East Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Papua
New Guinea, Peru, Zumania, Spain and Sweden. Id.
42. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX, para. 2.
43. See Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 275, 283 (1986).
44. See Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 163, 164 (1986).
45. Id.
46. See idL at 166.
47. Id. at 188.

COMPUTER &HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

Consequently, the United States or other "club" members are not
yet prepared to accept revision of a system which is successful and
promotes their own objectives.48 For the same reasons, the United
States is not likely to change its position on Antarctica due to any
pressure from third world countries or the United Nations when the
agreement comes up for revision in 1992.
3.

Application to Outer Space

Although beneficial to the United States and the international
community, only with limited adaptations appeasing some third
world desires will the use of Antarctica as a precedent for the development of future legal principles in outer space be likely accepted in
the near future. "Antarctica, like space, is an environment of extremes." 49 Such extreme environmental characteristics and lack of
indigenous human inhabitants 50 seem to dictate the possible application of Antarctica principles to the realm of outer space. This
fact is important since the physical characteristics of an environment will necessarily dictate the regulatory needs and the methods
for accomplishing any objective set forth. However, since the adoption of the Antarctica Treaty in 1959, the many political and legal
changes rather than any environmental changes that have occurred
in the international community hinder the application of the Antarctica Treaty to outer space.
A primary political change is seen by the increasing interests in
common resources and the third world's recent aggressive assertion
of international rights. The majority of developed nations no longer
have the free reign of power that existed in earlier decades of colonialism. Therefore, it is unlikely that the third world countries will
again allow the formation of a legal system governing territories beyond national jurisdictions, "common spaces," 5 1 such as Antarctica, the high seas or the outer space to be under the exclusive
48. Colson, The UnitedStates Position on Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 291, 300
(1986) (the views of the author, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State, are his own
and not necessarily those of the United States government).
49. Stovitz & Loomis, Space Law: Lessons Learnedfrom the Antarctic, PROCEEDINGS
oF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 165, 168 (1985).

50. Id.
51. Territories beyond national jurisdiction consist of two catagories, res nullius and res
communis. The term "common spaces" is synonymous with res communis which refers to
territories owned by no one but free to use by all. Therefore, res communis territories, such as
outer space, are not subject to sovereignty claims by any nation just as set out in the Outer
Space Treaty. Res nuilius is the term used for territories in colonialism days where the territories belonged to no one but which could be appropriated and subjected to exclusive control
of the sovereign.
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control of only a few states. Hence, the controversy of a legal system for outer space acceptable to all remains.
The Antarctica governing system is based on the decisions of a
small group of nations with a "substantial and demonstrated interest" in Antarctica.5 2 The majority of these nations, with exception

of the United States and the USSR, also have territorial claims to
portions of Antarctica. These claims are not recognized by the rest
of the world. 3 However, Article IV of the Antarctica Treaty
reserves the territorial claims made by states before the treaty was
adopted. Specifically:
1. Nothing contained in this present Treaty shall be interpreted
as:

(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously
asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty of
Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party
of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of
its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise. 55
On the other hand, outer space, through the Outer Space
Treaty, has already adopted the universal participation approach
shown by the involvement of the United Nations.5 6 Today, any
treaty on space is subject to the approval of the General Assembly.
The Outer Space Treaty specifically states that "[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a
basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies." 5 7 Additionally Article II states that "[o]uter space ... is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means."5 8 The two treaties directly
conflict on the point of "sovereignty" to territories beyond national
jurisdiction. The Antarctica Treaty allows territorial claims while
the Outer Space Treaty expressly prohibits such claims. If a primary basis of each of the treaties directly conflict, the application of
either set of legal principles will not be applicable to the other with52. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
53. Hayashi, supra note 43, at 279.
54. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 1.
55. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
56. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2.
57. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I
58. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. II.
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out some revisions and adaptations. Each is based on a different
legal analysis; Antarctica's is one of the past. Today, the third
world states will play a much larger part in the governing and decisions regarding areas such as outer space. Consequently, the third
world nations will not agree to a legal structure which effectively
eliminates their voting power and influence such as the Antarctic
Treaty has done.
4. Technological Ramifications of Application
The United States would like to see a legal structure in outer
space similar to that of Antarctica because it essentially protects
their primary interest in outer space development and non-renewable resource exploitation. A substantial possibility of exploitation of
non-renewable minerals now exists in Antarctica.5 9 Moreover, all
consultative states are familiar with the environmental and developmental aspects of the region and hold the same commitments of
ensuring environmental protection and international cooperation in
organization and scientific investigation. Consequently, the
Antarctic Regime is a team effort which eases differences and promotes cooperation in antarctic activities such as non-renewable resource exploitation which is currently being addressed by the
consultative parties." Therefore, a similar political and ldgal approach in outer space would also seem to promote outer slace development when that opportunity arises. Hence, the United States
should support the use of a governing system like Antarctica's in
outer space. A "small group negotiation minimizes the risk of offensive economic rhetoric and confusing detail on access to
61
resources."
5.

Conclusion

The principles of the Antarctica regime will not be directly applicable to outer space without some adjustments. Although the
Antarctica Treaty first addressed states' rights in earth's "common
spaces,"'6 2 the specific theories and legal rights mentioned are
unique to that treaty due to its history of formation after state occupation and claims of sovereignty. Therefore, the specific solutions
to political confrontations regarding Antarctica do not directly ap59. See Francioni, supra note 44, at 165.
60. See generally Francioni, supra note 44.
61. Oxman, Antarctica and the New Law of the Sea, 19 CORNELL INT'L W. 211, 246
(1986).
62. See supra note 51.
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ply to other situations like outer space without appropriate concessions made to the non-party states. Whatever specific legal conflicts
exist over Antarctica, it suffices to say that the advent of the nonparty states' challenge to the party states' complete control of the
occupied territories and resources signals a trend in international
law toward the involvement of world organizations and the application of res communis6 3 principles to those conflicts.
B. Moon Treaty
1. Issues
A potential but controversial precedent for outer space regulation is the Moon Treaty of 1979. The foundation of the Moon
Treaty and the reason for the controversy is the common heritage of
mankind concept which ironically" was first proposed by the
United States.65 Of additional controversy is the possible existence
of a moratorium on exploitation of the non-renewable celestial resources until such a time as an international regime to govern such
exploitation is formed.
2.

Background

With the lunar landing of 1969 and the new potential of celestial exploitation emerging, the developing nations began a crusade
to secure future rights to the benefits of outer space research and
exploitation.6 6 Beginning in 1970, Argentina began the crusade by
submitting the first draft agreement on principles to govern the activities surrounding the exploitation of outer space on the moon and
other celestial bodies.6 7 This draft formed the basis for the Moon
Treaty which was then and is now surrounded in controversy. Due
to this controversy, it is unlikely that the Moon Treaty will ever be
adopted to govern outer space or the exploitation of celestial resources. However, it is possible that some of these controversial
themes could find forums in the development of outer space regula63. Supra note 51.
64. The United States originally proposed the CHM terminology in a 1972 draft proposal for the Moon Treaty as an extension of the legal principles set down in the Outer Space
Treaty. The United States intended no curtailment of exploitative rights but just the same,
has itself, opened up the bag of worms that has since plagued the negotiations of outer space
legislation. See DIGEST, supra note 32, at 675-76.
65. DIGEST, supra note 32, at 675 (discussing the history of the United States' part in
the negotiation of the Moon Treaty).
66. See COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 390.
67. See COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 390.
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tion. Consequently, a watchful eye must be maintained to protect
free market interests.
3.

Developing Nations Interpretation

The common heritage of mankind principle found its way into
the Moon Treaty through Argentina's original draft agreement. In
order to secure the developing nations rights to the future benefits
of outer space, Argentina proposed that the "natural resources of
the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of
mankind," 6 that the benefits from the use of such resources shall be
available to all states and "that the distribution of such benefits
should take account of the need for higher standards of living and
conditions of economic and social progress and development, in
light of the interests and requirements of developing countries and
the rights of those using such resources."6 9 In the eyes of the third
world nations, this is the basis of the Moon Treaty.
4. United States Interpretation
The United States originally proposed the CHM terminology
but only meant it as an extension of the "province of mankind"
terminology as used in the Outer Space Treaty.7" The United States
felt the moon and other celestial bodies were to be available for use
and research by all states such that "[o]uter space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and
use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international law .. ."7 The
United States backed the position that any state could "use" the
non-renewable resources of celestial bodies but that no state could
claim soveriegn property rights in them. However, in no way did
the United States propose that the moon and other celestial bodies
be designated as "common property" as the developing nations now
view it; that all resources and the benefits derived from outer space
are the common property of all states to be distributed "equitably"
only under an international governing scheme.72
68. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supranote 22, at 390 (quoting the original draft agreement on the principles governing activities in the use of natural resources of the Moon and
other celestial bodies. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr. 1); see United Nations, Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its ninth
session (8 June - 3 July 1970) to the Committee. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85 (1970)).
69. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 390.
70. S 115 Hearings,supra note 16, at 13.
71. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, para. 2.
72. S 115 Hearings,supra note 16, at 11.

COMMERCILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE

1991]

The position of the United States is supported by the use of the
Outer Space Treaty language repetitively in the Moon Treaty. 3 It
would seem that the use of the same language in the Moon Treaty
as in the Outer Space Treaty would be for the purpose of expressing
the identical general principles and not the radically different ones
proposed by the third world. After all, the Moon Treaty was to
supplement the legal structure of outer space not change it.
5.

Effects of Differing Interpretations
a. Generally

With continued negotiations, the passage of the LOS Treaty
and its respective use of the CHM concept, the developed nations
validly fear that the concept of common heritage of mankind may
begin to take on a legal definition.7 4 However, the negotiating states
did not intend such a "common property" interpretation in the
Moon Treaty evidenced by the clause inserted after the CHM terminology stating that the terms will have a significance independent of
other meanings and specifically tailored to the Moon Treaty
alone. 75 "The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this
Agreement .... ,76 Thus, the use of the CHM terminology in the
LOS Treaty should not influence the interpretation of the CHM
concept in the Moon Treaty. However, it seems that this has
occurred.
In view of the LOS Treaty and its definition of the CHM terminology, the developing third world countries are not backing down.
These states strongly assert the precedent set by the LOS Treaty as
to the interpretation of the CHM concept. They also see their
stance "as a mechanism for forcing the transfer of wealth, technology, and political power" from the developed states to the undeveloped states.7 7 Under this common property view, each state would
have one vote, an equal voice in controlling and establishing the
commercial uses of non-renewable celestial resources. A strong influential position considering none of the third world states have the
technology or necessary experience relating to outer space. To back
down from their position would be to abandon their best chance of
quick gains in all aspects of international power.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2; Moon Treaty, supra note 5.
S 115 Hearings,supra note 16, at 4.
S 115 Hearings, supra note 16, at 5.
Moon Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11, para. 1.
COMM. PRINT PART 3 1980, supra note 10, at 325.
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The effect of the Moon Treaty as accepted and applied to outer
space would also be felt adversely by the third world countries now
lobbying for the Treaty, the moratorium, and the equitable sharing
of outer space benefits. As the world stands today, private interest
groups, especially in the United States and industrialized nations,
provide for the technological advances which improve the standards
of living, medical prospects and agricultural production of these
same third world states. Through the application of the Moon
Treaty principles to Outer Space Treaty which forecloses outer
space to private sector investment, the third world is in effect cutting its own throat. Without the United States and other industrial
nations conducting research in outer space, the benefits of technology for which the third world states wish to reserve rights will never
occur. 78 Without secure financial investment potential, the private
corporation will not be willing to even begin scientific research and
exploration phases which means no new knowledge or technology
will become available in which the third world nations can share.
b.

Technical and FinancialEffects

The United States will not likely approve the Moon Treaty or
the application of its principles to the rest of outer space due to its
adverse effect on technological advancement and investment of the
private sector in outer space. The concept of CHM is a substantial
deterrent to investment of the private sector in areas of space commercialization and celestial exploitation. The fact remains that the
exact benefits to be derived from celestial exploitation are yet unknown. Therefore, to lay down specific regulations governing such
activity would prejudice the financial potential of the United States'
interest.
Additionally, consequently, opponents to the CHM concept
fear any use of the term in future agreements will unduly favor the
Soviets.7 9 The adoption of the CHM and its resulting moratorium
will "erect barriers to free enterprise.... The end result is that the
Soviets can move forward in the area of resource development at
their own pace under the guise of scientific investigation, with no
fear of significant competition from the West, which must rely on
its industry to provide commercial incentive." 80 While barriers will
always exist, they should be erected by those most familiar with the
78. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 271.
79. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 312.
80. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 312.
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environment of outer space and with the greatest investment stake
in outer space.
As long as the United States can stay in the company of the
world's other industrial nations like Japan, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, support for the broad interpretation of CHM as
merely an extension of "province of mankind" can stand. These
countries retain sixty percent of the gross national product (GNP)
and thus, in essence, hold a major role in determining international
customary law relating to commercial and industrial practice."'
While no weighted voting exists in fact, those with a high level of
trade have power over those without such trade, at least in the investment arenas.
Supporters of the Moon Treaty in the developing nations feel
that the clause in article 11 limiting the CHM concept only to the
provisions and the negotiation history of the treaty is authoritative
and will counteract the third world's efforts to establish their interpretation of the CHM concept as a legal definition. These supporters feel the United States and other private sector states will still
have control over adopting the policies of the international regime
to govern celestial exploitation because the terms of the treaty only
require a good faith effort at establishing a future regime.8 2 No
mandate requires an actual formation of a regime and therefore, the
United States is still free to protect its interests.
Specifically, article 11(5) states that "[s]tates Parties to this
Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime.... "83 The wording of the agreement states that only parties
to the agreement will undertake the formation of the regime. The
supporters of the treaty point to this as also allowing United States
to protect its interest by having a hand in the formation. Additionally, the supporters stress that the term "undertake" does not dictate the-actual formation, only an effort. This argument supports
the fact that the United States must at least have a hand in the
establishment of a satisfactory international regime if they are to
further protect their interests.8 " But since few states have yet ratified the agreement, and France is the only space power yet to do
so,8 5 the future adoption of this treaty and the legal acceptance of
its newly defined concepts of CHM seem unlikely.
81. SIMMONDS, UN CONFERENCE ON LAW OF THE SEA 1982 xxiii (1983). See infra
notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
82. S 115 Hearings,supra note 16, at 4.
83. Moon Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11, para. 5.
84. S 115 Hearings,supra note 16, at 14.
85. The Moon Treaty has been signed by Austria, Chile, France, Guatemala, India,
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Issue of an Implied Moratorium

a. Third World View
Further technological ramifications of the application of the
Moon Treaty to outer space result from the interpretation of the
Moon Treaty as imposing a moratorium on celestial exploitation
until an international regime is formed to govern the exploitation.
The third world states assert that the CHM concept necessarily implies a moratorium on any celestial exploitation of non-renewable
resources until an international regime governing such activities is
formed. If one does not own the resources then one may not use
them. This moratorium possibility creates additional reasons for
the industrialized nations not to adopt the Treaty and to leave the
legal regulation of outer space to the Outer Space Treaty and their
own national interests.
b. Developed Nations View
Private interest groups have raised objections to the proposed
moratorium due to the financial impact it will have on private investment. It has been recognized that for the development of nonrenewable celestial resources, substantial private investment will be
necessary. For such development, long term scientific research, feasibility tests, exploration and marketing will be necessary before any
celestial exploitation is possible. 6 Consequently, instability in the
political climate surrounding the space arena will discourage private interests from expending the capital necessary for long term
development. Private business must expect a profit from their ventures and the possibility of a moratorium in the near future decreases the likelihood of profitable research investment.
Evidence of decreased profitability is exhibited by the reaction
of private corporations in the 1970's to the pending LOS Treaty and
its explicit United Nations moratorium resolution. During this
time and since, U.S. industry severely cut back its seabed expenditures and disbanded technical teams researching future industrial
exploitation of the area. 7 Consequently, even if the moratorium is
not de jure required, it has de facto been implemented. These corporations fear the implementation of the LOS regime in outer space
will again threaten their investments and thus will refuse to take the
Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, Romania and Uruguay. Christol, The
Moon Treaty Enters Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1985).
86. COMM. PRINT PART 3 1980, supra note 10, at 321.
87. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 270.
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risk. If the CHM principles and the implied moratorium on celestial exploitation are applied to outer space by the majority of the
world's nations, the private sectors in the United States as well as
Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom will have to reevaluate
their position on investing capital in an area of political instability
and financial insecurity.
7.

Conclusion

Even with their vehement opposition to third world claims, the
United States and many other industrial nations realize that some
sort of governing regime is necessary for future development of celestial exploitation in order to secure the international cooperation
in outer space underlying the Outer Space Treaty. However, it is
the restrictive and "something for nothing" views of the third world
that have caused a roadblock in negotiations for applicable legal
principles and a workable regime for outer space. When these underdeveloped states begin to compromise, realizing who it is that is
supplying the technology and benefits, then maybe a world organization will be formed. Until then it seems unlikely the industrial
nations, as foreshadowed by the LOS negotiations, will foreclose to
the private sector financial investment, which is the basis of the
these states' economies by accepting the concept of a moratorium.
C. Law of the Sea Treaty
The most substantial and recent legal precedent applicable to
outer space regulation is the LOS Treaty. However, as with the
Moon Treaty, the United States will not recognize its legal significance with respect to outer space due to its one sided benefits to the
third world states and its restrictions on the industrialized nations'
private enterprise.
1. Treaty Analysis
a. General Characteristics
The LOS Treaty is based on the same primary concepts as the
Moon Treaty, the CHM concept. However, the LOS Treaty is a
more substantial agreement containing guidelines and regulations
for an international resource exploitation regime for the deep seabed. It is through this regime that the CHM concepts are put to
practical use. As does the Moon Treaty, the LOS Treaty recognizes
the interests of the lesser developed countries (LDC) by establishing
that the high seas and seabed are not subject to national appropria-
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tion 8 and are to be used for peaceful purposes.8 9 However, the
LOS Treaty's precise definition of the CHM and Moon Treaty's declaratory use of CHM are not identical.
Interesting analogies exist between the modem law of the high
sea and outer space law. Caution, however, should be exercised
in comparing analogous notions. Principles may be identical; details may vary considerably. A case in point is the Common
Heritage of Mankind doctrine, as applied differently respectively
to the Moon and other celestial bodies on the one hand, and to
the seabed beyond national jurisdiction on the other." 90
b.

Organization

The LOS Treaty actually puts the CHM concepts to work

through the international organization responsible for governing
deep seabed mining, the International Seabed Authority. 91 The In-

ternational Seabed Authority, through its mining arm, the Enterprise, controls the industrial exploitation of the seabed. 92 The
Seabed Authority regulates industrial exploitation by requiring approval of mining applications in order to conduct mining activities
in the deep seabed. 93 However, "[u]nder the treaty, the Authority

may require any individual, nation, or other organization wishing to
develop the resources of the seabed to share its technology and prof-

its with the Authority. The Authority in turn must use these contributions for the benefits of all nations." 94 This requirement for
transfer of technology or profits to the Authority is absolute95
which exemplifies the equitable sharing concept of CHM.
Additionally, the Enterprise limits the amount of seabed area a
88. LOS Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 137 and 89.
89. LOS Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 138, 141 and 88.
90. Haanappel, ComparisonsBetween the Law of the Sea and Outer Space Law: Exploration and Exploitation, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 145, 147 (1985) (author is the Associate Dean, Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and Associate Professor, Institute of Air and Space Law,
McGill University).
91. LOS Treaty, supra note 6, art. 157.
92. LOS Treaty, supra note 6, art. 158, para. 2, art. 170; COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980,
supra note 22, at 438.
93. LOS Treaty, supra note 6, art. 151, para. 2 and Annex III, art. 3.
94. Note, ExtraterrestrialLaw on the FinalFrontier. A Regime to Govern the Development of CelestialBody Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1439 n.88 (1983) (analyzing Draft Final
Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/conf.62/
121 (Oct. 21, 1982)).
95. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 438; see LOS Treaty, supra note 6,
art. 144 and Annex III, art. 5.
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company may mine and the amount of resource it may market.9 6
The area the company chooses to mine must be divided into two
sections. One section is reserved for the developing states' use. 97
However, the industrial company must provide the data and research on both parcels. All these requirements are to preserve the
benefits of deep seabed mining for the developing states as dictated
by the CHM concept.
The one vote per member decision making process of the Enterprise is another aspect of the LOS Treaty. 98 Such a voting process has no basis in the levels of investment, experience, or activity
in the deep seabed. 99 The LOS Treaty creates an inflexible decision
making process due to the large bargaining power of the LDC's. 1°
Consequently, this organization could allow the third world countries, the Group of 77, whose greatest asset is their numbers, 10 1 to
take over effective control of the enterprise leaving the industrial
nation conducting the actual mining with little or no voice in the
affairs of the LOS Treaty. 2 Needless to say, this organization is a
materialization of the developing countries interpretations of the
Moon Treaty and its proposed international governing regime.
Naturally, the LDC's see this system as the beginning of a general
acceptance of CHM, as defined by the LOS Treaty, as a legal
doctrine.
2.

Application to Outer Space

It is unlikely that the acceptance of this governing regime as a
supplemental agreement to the substantive legal structure of outer
space will occur. Realizing that the LOS Treaty was the unique
result of complex negotiations due to the numerical superiority of
the Group of 77,103 the developed nations must now realize that the
acceptance and application in outer space of a negotiation process
and regime as used in the LOS Treaty is to release all control in
96.

LOS Treaty, supra note 6, art. 151, COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at

438.
97. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 438.
98. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 438.
99. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 438.
100. Haanappel, supra note 90, at 147.
101. Note, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law, 21
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 309 (1983).
102. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 439.
103. See generally Danilenko,InternationalLaw of the Sea and OuterSpace: Transfer of
Technology Problem, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 124 (1985).
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these future economic and scientific regions. 1 4 "'[Ilt is unreasonable to presume that any advantage won by the numerical superiority
of the Group of 77 in the seabed negotiations will be relinquished
under similar conditions in outer space.' "15 On the contrary, the
LDC will have to respect the interests of the major space powers if
any equitable sharing of the benefits from exploration, exploitation
and scientific investigation is to occur." "If that regime (LOS
Treaty) is perceived as a threat to commercial development of ocean
resources, a similar regime to control extraterrestrial resources
might also serve to deter industry investment in the exploitation of
extraterrestrial resources." 107 Possible ramifications on technical
investment and the associated loss of control over the governing
body and its decision making process are a few reasons why the
United States has refused to ratify the LOS Treaty.
Another argument against acceptance of the LOS Treaty by
the United States is the fear of the CHM concept taking on a legal
definition as a type of customary international law.10 8 This possible
result is evidenced by the COPUOS representative of Argentina
when he stated, "the reaflirmation of the established principle that
the Moon and its natural resources were the common heritage of
mankind would constitute an important step towards recognizing
the rights of developing countries to share in the benefits of technology even when they did not directly possess such technology themselves." 1" Similar fears are expressed in conjunction with transfer
of technology issues. The mandatory provisions of the LOS Treaty
on technology transfer "could create a precedent for the international regulation of technology transfer" ' which "'could find its
way into agreements relating to space.' "

104. Note, supra note 94, at 1439.
105. Rosenfield, The Moon Treaty: The United States Should Not Become a Party,
American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 74th Annual Meeting 164 (1980).
106. Danilenko, supra note 103, at 124.
107. COMM. PRINT PART 4 1980, supra note 22, at 439.
108. See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
109. Danilenko, supra note 103, at 123 (quoting U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR 366, pp.
607 (1979)).
110. Danilenko, supra note 103, at 123.
111. Law of the Sea: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oceanographyand the Comm. on
MerchantMarine andFisheries,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1982) (statement of T. Kronmiller,

Department of State).
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D.

Customary InternationalLaw
1. Applicability of Customary International Law to
Outer Space

Regardless of any regime adopted or the stance of the United
States and other industrial nations, customary international law will
have an effect on the future of outer space regulation. The Outer
Space Treaty specifically subjects outer space regulation to the principles of international law.' 12 Furthermore, as dictated by the International Court of Justice, the sources of international law are:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
3
law."1
Under the second source of international law, any emerging
principle of law, as soon as accepted as a general practice, will have
an effect on how outer space is regulated. For example, the CHM
could become customary international law if ratified through nations' use and consistently interpreted in future agreements such as
the LOS Treaty and the Moon Treaty; the developed states' primary fear. This acceptance would have a major effect on the future
financial potential of outer space." 4
However, if the industrial nations continue to reject the CHM
principle, it will never be accepted as custom and fade out of the
outer space regulatory picture. It must be realized that the majority
of the 130 nations signing the LOS Treaty were third world countries without the technology to mine the seabed anyway.' 5 Thus, if
custom is measured by the practice of states, the developed states
are a determining force as to customary law regarding technological
issues since they are the only ones able to "practice."" ' 6 Without
the approval of the United States and other space powers, the concept is doomed to fail." 7
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1.
See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
Note, supra note 101, at 336.
Note, supra note 101, at 336.
See supra note 12.
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E. Conclusion to Precedents Section
Outer space legal principles should evolve slowly with direct
influence by the major space powers. No precedents directly apply.
Consequently, outer space needs a unique set of regulations.
While it is possible and advisable to learn from other branches of
international law, such law as the law of the sea, which has a
much longer tradition and has reached a much greater volume in
its growth, any application of experience in other branches
should be adapted to a specific approach to problems of space
law, which require original and usually unprecedented
solutions.1 18
V.

CURRENT U.S. SPACE POLICY

A.

Generally

In view of the unpredictable future of the outer space regulatory negotiations, the United States has adopted its own unilateral
space policy focusing on leadership in space and increased efforts at
space commercialization. Through the National Commercial Space
Policy (NCSP), NASA has in recent years supported commercial
space activities and helped reduce risks of doing business in
space.' 19 NASA's goals are reflected through the NCSP's policies
of:
1) to establish new links with the private sector; 2) to not interfere with private investment decisions despite the government's
view of the projects feasibility; 3) to encourage the private sector
to operate a space project if the private sector can do so more
efficiently than the government; 4) to invest in research and facilities to encourage private investment, but NASA will not spend
tax dollars for plans that private enterprise is willing to expend;
and 5) to contribute significantly to a private commercial endeavor, if the private sector has significant capital at risk and
120
there are potential benefits for the nation.
The NCSP regulates private space activities in compliance with
international outer space responsibilities but encourages commer118. Kopal, Analogies and Differences in the Development of the Law of the Sea and the
Law of Outer Space, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE

151, 154 (1985).

119. Note, United States CommercialSpace Policy: Impact on InternationalandDomestic Law, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 129, 140 (1986).
120. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Commercial Use of Space Policy (Oct. 29, 1984) [hereinafter NCSP].
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cialization in the face of international discord. 2 1 This may cause
conflicts with specific international regulations depending on the interpretations of the applicable outer space legislation but emphasizes the fact that the United States will not again lose control of
negotiations involving future business opportunities as in the LOS
Treaty.122 As Soviet legal scholar Gregory Tunkin said,
"[a]ccording to the principle of sovereign equality of states, no state
or group of states can create norms of international law binding
upon other states. The actual state of international relations nowadays would make it futile for any group of states to attempt to dictate rules of conduct to other states."12 As of January 5, 1988, the
specific goals of NASA were:
(1) to strengthen the security of the United States; (2) to obtain
scientific, technological, and economic benefits for the general
population and to improve the quality of life on Earth through
space-related activities; (3) to encourage continuing United
States private-sector investment inspace and related activities;
(4) to promote international cooperative activities taking into account United States national security, foreign policy, scientific,
and economic interests; (5) to cooperate with other nations in
maintaining the freedom of space for activities that enhance the
security and welfare of mankind; and, as a long-range goal; (6) to
expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the
solar system. 124
Although "exploitation" does not appear in the goals or programs
of the U.S. space policy to discourage international dissent from
third world states. However, NASA's policy is obvious. It prepares
the United States for the commercialization of space whether or not
an international governing regime is formed. Furthermore, the U.S.
achievegovernment has implemented programs to facilitate the
12
ment of these space policy goals and commercialization. 1
B. Legality of U.S. Policy
The legal justifications for the U.S. space policy and actions
121. See Note, supra note 119, at 148.
122. See Note, supra note 119, at 149.
123. Note, supranote 97, at 335 n.112 (quoting Tunkin, InternationalLaw in the InternationalSystem, 4 RESUEIL DES CouRs 9, 130 (1975)).
124. Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Directive on National Space Policy (Feb.
11, 1989).
125. See HOSENBALL AND REEVE, UNITED STATES SPACE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION, A PREFACE TO U.S. SPACE LAWS AND POLICIES, 15 (1989);
see generally San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 11, 1990 at 5A,col. 4 (concerning Vice President
Quayle commenting on President Bush's new plans for space commercialization).

COMPUTER & HIGHTECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

follow from their interpretations of the legal principles set down in
the Outer Space Treaty. Since the United States has not yet ratified
the Moon Treaty, it is not subject to the specific set of regulations
and principles set out in that agreement. 126 Therefore, the United
States is able to interpret the general terms of the Outer Space
Treaty in a light most favorable to their goals. 12 7 Additionally, the
Outer Space Treaty can be used as international law is normally
used, as after-the-fact justification for action. Political conflict is a

separate issue. 128
The legality of private action in outer space presents yet another issue needing definitive resolution. The Outer Space Treaty
addresses states' actions in restricting certain activities in outer
space. 29 Article VI of the Treaty imposes responsibility on the
states for any actions of its nationals.13 0 Therefore, in promoting
the commercialization of space by U.S. private sectors, the United
States is responsible for all results, legal or illegal. Nevertheless,
this paternal attitude and the U.S. policy encouraging private enterprise in outer space will increase activity and alleviate fears of lost
investments and legal battles over activities. The promotion of private interests by the United States evidenced by the shouldering of
responsibility for private actions should promote faith in the industries' expectations of outer space commercialization.
VI.

AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR GOVERNING OUTER
SPACE

A. A Need
By promoting private enterprise, the United States still recognizes the need for a cooperative association to regulate outer space
activities. 31 The political and financial desirability of such an association is enormous and must be continually monitored by the
United States.13 2 Technologically, "there appear to be no other insurmountable technological impediments to the exploitation of extraterrestrial resources." 133 From the viewpoint of the United
126. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
127. Note, supra note 115, at 129.
128. Supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
129. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2.
130. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI.
131. See generally Raclin, InternationalCooperation in Commercial Activities in Outer
Space: Is it Necessary, Desirable or Feasible?,PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 234 (1987).
132. See generally id.
133. See Raclin, supra note 131, at 236-37.
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States, international cooperation in the governance and regulation
of outer space would be both politically and financially beneficial.13 4
However, as discussed earlier, a regime similar to LOS will not be
135
accepted.
Politically, the exclusion of all but the few developed nations
capable of outer space development would cause international resentment and consequently, "complicate significantly terrestrial
political relationships."' 3 6 In order to ease future international tensions and to promote international cooperation in other aspects of
world endeavors, "the developed countries must now recognize, at
least to some extent, the developing countries' demands to have a
voice in the development and exploitation of outer space
resources."'

1 37

Financially, few nations have the actual resources to undertake
such a massive enterprise as outer space exploration and exploitation.' 38 Furthermore, even the nations with such resources are realizing that international cooperation is financially superior in that
duplicative programs of nations are avoided. 139 The United States,
especially, is finding political obstacles to continued escalating outer
space development costs. Consequently, the United States will and
does support international financial cooperation as well as opening
up space development to private agencies outside the U.S.
government.
These political and financial factors combined with the confusion over private enterprises' rights in space commercialization and
the associated risks and costs of such undertakings point toward
renewed need for international governmental cooperation and involvement in future outer space development. The mitigation of
private fears of loss of capital and lesser developed states' exclusion
in outer space activities is a must for future advancement.
B. Formation
There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of
success, nor more dangerous to manage than the creation of a
new system; For the initiator has the enmity of those who would
profit by the preservation of the old system and merely lukewarm
134. See Raclin, supra note 131, at 234 (quoting 5115 Hearing,supra note 16, at 54).
135. See infra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
136. Raclin, supra note 131, at 236.
137. Raclin, supra note 131, at 236.
138. Raclin, supra note 131, at 236-7.
139. Raclin, supra note 131, at 237.
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defenders in those who would gain from the new one. 140
In forming the regime, it will be necessary to account for the
risks and hazards undertaken by the space powers in actually developing the space frontier. Consequently, a regime similar to but not
identical to that of Antarctica should be adopted. While it is realized that the third world states will not give up all their perceived
rights in future benefits from outer space, especially in view of
CHM, the only regime acceptable to world space powers will be one
under their control. This type of regime may be acceptable to the
third world states if certain specific benefits and rights are reserved
for them. Alternatively, the major space powers could be given a
weighted vote over the non-space powers to allow those taking the
risk the most control while also giving the non-space powers some
say in governing outer space activities.
A regime fashioned after the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) voting arrangement is a potential solution to the dispute over
outer space regulation. Under the IMF, the voting procedures are
undertaken through two decision-making organs, the Board of Governors and the Executive Board. 4 ' The Board of Governors are
responsible for the major decisions and only meet once a year. 4 2
Each member state appoints one governor and one alternative to
the Board of Governors.' 4 3 The governor votes for its member state
through the votes alloted to that state. Each member state has a
minimum number of baseline votes. Additional votes are alloted to
each state weighted according to the amount of monetary contribution made to the IMF. "Each member shall have two hundred and
fifty votes plus one additional vote for each part of its quota
equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights." 1"
However, in order to correct for inequalities during the major impact votes, special majorities may be required which require higher
percentages of majority to pass a resolution. 45
140. Hammarskjold, Conceptual Evolution Caused and-Necessitated-by Technological
Advancement: Transition to Information-BasedSociety-A Case on Point, 11 ANNALS OF AIR
AND SPACE LAW 205 (1986) (quoting Niccolo Machiavelli 1469-1527).
141. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 2(a).
142. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 2(c).
143. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 2(a).
144. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 5(a).
145. See the following sections of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund requiring 75%
majority: art. III, § 3(d); art. V, §§ 7(e), 8(d), 9(c) and 120). See the following sections requiring 70% majority: art. V, §§ 7(g) and 9(a); art. XII, §§ 6(d), 6(f)(vi), 6(f)(ii) and 8; art.
XV, § 2; art. XIX, § 6(b). See the following sections requiring 85% majority: art. III, § 2(c);

art. V, § 12(d); art. XII, § 1; art. XXVI, § 2(b); art. XXIX(b); art. IV, § 2(c); art. V,§§ 7(c),
7(d), 12(f)(ii), 12(f)(iii) and 12(g); art. XV, § 2; art. XVII, § 3; art. XVIII, § 4(d); art. XX,
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The Executive Board conducts the daily business of the IMF
through twenty-one directors. 1" Five directorships are awarded to
the nations with the largest quotas, are non-elected and permanent. 147 Two directorships are awarded to the two largest creditors,
are non-elected and permanent. 148 The rest of the directors are
elected. 14 9 The Executive Board also votes on the weighted
method.
Using the IMF as a model, a voting arrangement based on the
amount of a states' monetary investment in the commercialization
of outer space may be acceptable to all states. First, a baseline
number of votes would be allocated to each state with an interest in
outer space. This "baseline interest" could be signified by a minimum amount of investment. This will allow all interested states a
voice in the regulation of outer space activities. The world's total
monetary investment in outer space commercialization programs
will be calculated. The total world's investment should be calculated as an average over the previous ten years of investment. Additional votes would be awarded for each percentage point of this
average held by a participating state. Each state's percentage of the
world's investment will also be averaged over that ten year period.
This averaging will hinder any one time "dumping" of cash into an
outer space program for the sole purpose of influencing specific
outer space votes through a one time increased percentage of world
investment. The averaging will determine the seriousness of a
state's interest in the commercialization of outer space while allowing time for that state to become familiar with all aspects of
outer space regulation before increased voting rights accrue. As
with Antarctica, those states with large voting rights will have the
most experience and interest in outer space commercialization.
As with the IMF, two voting organs could also be utilized; one,
like the Board of Governors, to pass on resolutions, policies and
legislation regulating outer space. The second, the Executive Board
will carry out the daily business of implementing the regulations set
down by the Board of Governors. Similarly, each state contributing
to outer space commercialization could appoint one governor to the
Board of Governors. As for the Executive Board, the five nations
with the largest investment in outer space and the two nations with
§ 7(b); art. XXIII, § 1; art. XXVII(a). See the following sections requiring 100% majority:
art. XXVI, § 1; art. III, § 2(d); Sched. C. para. 6.
146. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 3(b).
147. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 3(b).
148. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 3(c).
149. Articles of Agreement of the Fund, art. XII, § 3(b)(ii).
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the smallest contributions to outer space investment could appoint
permanent directors to the Executive Board. The two directors
from the smallest contributors will allow the less developed nations
participatory rights in the regulation of outer space while also assuring that their views will be heard. The states with the smallest
contributions must still have contributions above the minimum
amount qualifying for membership. Another 14 directors would be
elected from the ranks of those experts in outer space issues who
also have citizenship in member states. Again, special majorities
could be used in major decisions of both boards. However, it will be
necessary to structure such majority percentages to foreclose the
Group of 77 from acting collusively in hindering the purpose of the
regime. This may entail lower majorities than used in the IMF.
While a voting arrangement fashioned after the IMF may
cause discord among less developed nations and those nations with
less investment capabilities, the right to vote is ultimately left up to
them. With increased investment, these less developed nations can
have as large of a voice as they feel necessary. This solution may
seem to ignore the major problem of outer space commercialization
and non-renewable resource exploitation, which is the difficulty of
the third world nations coming up with the capital to invest. While
it is conceded that the lack of funds is a problem, it should not
overshadow the premise that the nations expending the capital,
time, resources and risk must have some security in their investment. Additionally, these same nations, as with Antarctica, are the
nations best fitted to determine what is and is not legislation for
outer space.
The arguments against the voting system in the IMF do not
apply to the realm of outer space. Opponents of the IMF system
cite lack of equity in proportion to population. These opponents
feel the distribution of monetary aid is in the control of the few who
need the aid the least. They feel the weighted system is unfair in
that those with the need should have more say. However, in the
outer space situation, the roles are reversed. The ability to direct
outer space development and activities is in the hands of those with
an interest. Population is not a determining factor. This situation
involves a free market system of future technology, not the necessities of life. Consequently, no lack of equity exists. Those with the
interest have the most control.
The investment of capital and its associated risks will force the
investing nations to act conservatively and only after careful examination of all the related factors. Too large a danger of inexperience
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and improper judgement exists in giving a large voting contingent
to nations without the knowledge of or interest in the future of
outer space. Consequently, the weighted voting system will allow
the less developed nations some say but will not allow them to band
together in frustrating the purpose of such a regime as has happened with the LOS Treaty.
Regardless of the procedure in giving power to those who bear
the risk, certain requirements of the regime should include: 1) a call
for regulation of activities only by those undertaking the activities
(albeit with the input of non-participant members); and 2) it must
not require the transfer of specific amounts of resources, benefits, or
technology, to countries not undertaking the risks of development;
and 3) must allow for some express distribution of benefits to all
member countries. These requirements have resulted from the experience of successes and failures with the LOS Treaty, the Moon
Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty. Each international agreement has
used various principles in governing and developing territorial lands
outside national jurisdiction, and each has contributed to international experience in governing and developing common spaces.
However, the unique nature of outer space and the benefits of hindsight points toward the need to fulfill these few above objectives.
Successful fulfillment of such should be beneficial and acceptable to
all involved. Consequently, an Antarctic iorm of regime complete
with an IMF type voting arrangement is necessary whether its principles are obsolete or not in view of today's international political
climate.
CONCLUSION

VII.

The Outer Space Treaty created a general legal framework for

outer space regulation. With the approach of significant international activity in outer space, new specific regulations must fill the
gaps left in the legal structure of the Outer Space Treaty. Legal
precedents such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Moon Treaty and the
LOS Treaty present some possibilities to the legal dilemma in outer
space but provide no concrete answers. Application of each precedent's legal basis produces controversial effects in the international
political community, the international scientific community and to
the technological development of outer space. For the United

States, the technological issue looms large as any efforts at curtailing U.S. private interest groups hinder U.S. goals in technological advancement and development as well as being a leader in outer

space.
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Of all the precedents, Antarctica is the best system after which
to model an outer space legal structure. The Antarctic environment
and legal structure best correlates with the environment of outer
space and the general legal structure already in place. However,
changes must be made in the outer space version to accommodate
the role of the non-space parties in these days of international cooperation and assistance. Hence, the legal system, while resembling
that of Antarctica, will basically give primary control to the space
powers through the implementation of a voting regime fashioned
after the IMF which will still allow the non-space powers their
voice.
The distribution of future benefits will have to fall in favor of
the space powers' needs to promote private investment and development. This does not dictate exclusion of the non-space powers.
Simply, for the system to function, the space powers must realize a
return on their investments. A regime fashioned after the Antarctic
Treaty and the IMF can be formed which includes benefits to all
states. Consequently, all the benefits of outer space can be realized
by all while fulfilling the prerequisite requirements of any investment oriented endeavor such as the commercialization and development of outer space and its celestial resources.

